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CASENOTES 
Government Contracts-ILLEGAL CONTRACTS-JURISDICTION OF 
COURT OF CLAIMS TO GRANT A QUANTUM ERUIT RECOV- 
ERY-Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552 
(Ct. Cl. 1978). 
In May of 1963 the Yosemite Park and Curry Co. (YPC) 
entered into a concession contract with the National Park Ser- 
vice. YPC agreed to provide services, including public transporta- 
tion, to the visitors of Yosemite Park for a reasonable charge. This 
agreement was modified in 1971 to require YPC to provide the 
sole means of transportation in Yosemite Park. In the new con- 
tract the National Park Service agreed to reimburse YPC's costs, 
including federal income taxes, and pay a profit calculated at  
twelve and one-half percent of YPC's average gross investment in 
the transportation equipment. l 
After YPC performed the modified contract for four years, a 
Department of Interior certifying officer informed YPC that the 
contract terms providing for reimbursement of federal income 
taxes and allowing more than ten percent profit on a cost-plus 
contract violated federal procurement law.2 The transportation 
contract was therefore illegal and invalid, and no payment could 
be allowed. 
YPC brought suit in the Court of Claims seeking the contract 
price for the transportation services provided. Both parties moved 
for summary judgment. The United States argued that there 
could be no recovery on a contract that violated federal procure- 
ment law.3 In an opinion written by Judge Kunzig, the Court of 
Claims agreed with the government that the contract was illegal 
and invalid, but allowed a recovery in quantum meruit not to 
exceed YPC's cost plus ten percent.' 
A. Sovereign Immunity in Federal Procurement 
The unusual holding in this case must be read in light of the 
general proposition, inherited from the common law of England, 
1. Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552, 554 (Ct. C1. 1978). 
2. Id. at 554-55. The statute and regulation violated are 41 U.S.C. 9 254(b) (1976) 
and 41 C.F.R. 4 l-l5.205-4l(a) (1) (1978). 
3. 582 F.2d at 555-56. 
4. Id. at 561. 
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that the government cannot be sued without its ~onsen t .~  In spite 
of the maxim that when the government enters the market place 
it becomes subject to the same laws that govern private parties," 
contract rights can only be enforced against the government when 
it has waived its immunity from suit.' The authority to waive 
federal sovereign immunity is vested solely in Congress." 
Congress has lessened the impact of federal sovereign im- 
munity in various ways. Originally, claims against the United 
States were brought before Congress for a hearing on the merits. 
If relief was appropriate Congress would pass a private bill pro- 
viding a recovery. When Congress could no longer effectively deal 
with the number of suits,9 it passed statutes waiving the govern- 
ment's immunity from broad classes of claims. The Tucker Act, 
passed in 1887, gave the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear 
contract actions against the United States. lo Although the lan- 
guage of the Tucker Act is broad, it actually delegates only lim- 
ited jurisdiction.ll Any suit which cannot be brought within the 
specific jurisdictional limits of the Tucker Act cannot be heard 
by the Court of Claims. 
Another device that mitigates the effects of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity is the power granted by Congress to the 
Comptroller General to settle accounts.12 As head of the General 
Accounting Office, the Comptroller General has responsibility to 
supervise the spending of public funds. To facilitate the execution 
5. For a concise discussion of sovereign immunity in the government contracts area, 
see Editorial Note, Government Subcontractors' Remedies in Rem, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
994 (1962). 
6. See generally Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579-82 (1934). 
7. The United States may not impair or abrogate its contractual obligations. Consent 
to sue the United States, however, is not part of any contractual obligation with the 
United States; consequently, a contractor may have a legal right to recovery but no 
remedy. Id. at  580-81. 
8. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 
495 (1940). 
9. For example, the private bills passed in 1883 (largely contract claims) cover 60 
pages of the Statutes at  Large. 22 Stat. 750-810 (1883). 
10. Tucker Act, ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505 (current version codified at  28 U.S.C. 4 § 
l346(a), 1491 (1976)). 
11. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra. 
12. 31 U.S.C. $5  71, 74 (1976). An individual or firm may file with the Comptroller 
General a claim arising out of a contract award or breach of contract. The General Ac- 
counting Office has no established procedure for filing such claims; both parties simply 
submit their versions of the case. Any disputed factual issues are resolved in favor of the 
government. See, e.g., 44 Comp. Gen. 353 (1964); 36 Comp. Gen. 507 (1957). The Comp- 
troller General resolves disputed factual issues in favor of the government because only 
the government is bound by his decisions. The contractor may still file suit under the 
Tucker Act after being denied relief by the Comptroller General. 
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of that responsibility, the Comptroller General has the authority 
to settle "[all1 claims and demands . . . in which the Govern- 
ment of the United States is concerned, either as debtor or credi- 
tor."13 Congress has further provided that decisions made by the 
Comptroller General on the settlement of public accounts are 
"final and conclusive upon the Executive Branch of the Govern- 
ment."14 Under limited circumstances, aggrieved contractors 
have had their claims settled by the Comptroller General without 
his ever reaching the question of the government's immunity from 
suit. Appeal to the Comptroller General, however, is useful only 
in those situations where the liability of the government can be 
determined from the record without examination of witnesses or 
consideration of conflicting evidence.15 
Through private bills and more recently through the Tucker 
Act and the settlement powers of the Comptroller General, the 
potentially harsh effects of sovereign immunity have been eased 
for those who deal contractually with the federal government. 
Certain claims remain, however, for which there may be no effec- 
tive waiver of immunity. One of these is a claim based upon a 
contract that violates procurement law or regulations. 
B. Illegal Contracts and the Tucker Act 
1. Recovery upon an illegal express contract 
When the terms of a contract with the government violate 
the central purpose of a procurement statute, courts follow the 
general rule of private contract law of no recovery on illegal con- 
- -- - - -- -- - - 
13. 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1976). Similar settlement powers have been granted to all con- 
tracting officers under the recently passed Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95- 
563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified at  41 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-613 (Supp. 1979)). Section 4 of the Act 
provides: 
Each executive agency is authorized to settle, compromise, pay, or otherwise 
adjust any claim by or against, or dispute with, a contractor relating to a con- 
tract entered into by it or another agency on its behalf, including a claim or 
dispute initiated after award of a contract, based on breach of contract, mistake, 
misrepresentation, or other cause for contract modification or recision, but 
excluding a claim or dispute for penalties for forfeitures prescribed by statute 
or regulation which another agency is specifically authorized to administer, 
settle, or determine. 
Although the report accompanying the bill is silent on the issue, see generally H.R. REP. 
No. 1556, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), this statute may provide another possible remedy 
for a contractor who in good faith enters a contract in violation of procurement law. . 
14. 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1976). 
15. 44 Comp. Gen. 353, 358 (1964). See also Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller 
General and Government Contracts, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 349, 362-66 (1970). 
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tracts.16 For example, in Acme Process Equipment Co. v. United 
States, l7 the government claimed it could cancel a contract for the 
production of rifles, even though the contractor had prepared for 
production at considerable expense, because the contractor vio- 
lated the Anti-Kickback Act.18 The Court of Claims rejected this 
argument, holding that cancellation of contracts was not one of 
the sanctions provided in the Anti-Kickback Act.lg The Supreme 
Court reversed, reasoning that a contract should not be enforced 
when enforcement would vitiate the central purpose of a statute.20 
The Court of Claims denied recovery in the similar case of 
City of Los Angeles v. United  state^.^' Los Angeles agreed to pay 
$75,000 to the Department of the Interior to investigate a dam site 
a t  Boulder Canyon. The Department agreed to reimburse the city 
should Congress ever make funds available for investigation and 
construction of Boulder Dam. When Congress did appropriate 
funds for that purpose, Los Angeles brought suit in the Court of 
Claims seeking reimbursement of the money advanced. The 
Court of Claims held that the agreement violated the Anti- 
Deficiency Act, which prohibited obligation of public funds prior 
to appropriation. Therefore, no recovery could be allowed.z2 
Although there are cases with dicta to the contrary,% the 
cases with clear holdings stand for the proposition that no recov- 
ery is allowed on a government contract that violates the central 
purpose of a statute affecting government  procurement^.^^ The 
harshness of this rule prohibiting recovery on illegal express con- 
tracts is eased in private contract law by such doctrines as quasi- 
contract and estoppel.25 These doctrines permit recovery of the 
value of the benefit conferred, when justice requires it, even 
16. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS $ 598 (1932). Comment, Restitutionary Relief Under 
Illegal Contracts in California, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1143 (1968). 
17. 347 F.2d 509 (Ct. C1. 1965), reu'd, 385 U.S. 138 (1966). 
18. 347 F.2d at 519. 
19. Id. a t  521. 
20. 385 U.S. at 145. 
21. 68 F. Supp. 974 (Ct. C1. 1946). 
22. 68 F. Supp. at 976. 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 566 
n.22 (1961); Crooker v. United States, 240 US.  74, 81-82 (1916). In both of these cases 
recovery was denied on illegal contract grounds; however, each opinion contains language 
to the effect that a quantum meruit recovery would be proper if a tangible benefit had 
been conferred upon the government. 
24. E.g., United States v. Acme Process Equip, Co., 385 U.S. a t  138; Pan Am. Petro. 
& Transp. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 456,509-10 (1927); City of Los Angeles v. United 
States, 68 F. Supp. at 976; Loehler v. United States, 90 Ct. C1. 158, 164 (1940). 
25. See, e.g., Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U S .  415 (1880); Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Cham- 
plin Ref. Co., 46 F.2d 511 (D. Me. 1931); Hunt v. Turner, 9 Tex. 193 (1853). 
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though the party performed pursuant to an illegal contract. The 
doctrines, however, are not available to the same extent in gov- 
ernment contract law.26 
2. Recovery upon an implied contract 
The section of the Tucker Act granting jurisdiction to the 
Court of Claims states: 
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judg- 
ment upon any claim against the United States founded either 
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation 
of an executive department, or upon any express or implied 
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliqui- 
dated damages in cases not sounding in tort.*' 
The grant of jurisdiction for implied contracts has been consis- 
tently interpreted by the Supreme Court as providing jurisdiction 
to hear claims only on contracts implied in fact, not those implied 
in law.28 The distinction turns on mutual manifestation of assent: 
26. Because the Court of Claims has less flexibility in dealing with illegal contracts, 
it has been less willing to find procurement contracts illegal. See R. NASH & J. CIBINIC, 
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW 863 (3d ed. 1977). See also John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 
325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. C1. 1963) ("court should ordinarily impose the binding stamp of 
nullity only when the illegality is plain"). The Court of Claims will decide whether the 
illegality is serious enough to justify a finding that the contract is void in ligh; of applica- 
ble public policy. When the question of legality is close, the contractor is accorded the 
benefit of the doubt in order to allow the reimbursement of good faith expenditures. Id. 
at 438. For other cases showing the reluctance of the courts to find government contracts 
illegal, see American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. United States, 259 US .  75,78 (1922); Warren 
Bros. Rd. Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 612 (Ct. C1. 1965). 
27. 28 U.S.C. $ 1491 (1976). 
28. See Alabama v. United States, 282 US. 502 (1931); United States v. Minnesota 
Mut. Inv. Co., 271 US.  212 (1926); Merrit v. United States, 267 U.S. 338 (1925). See also 
Jankowitz v. United States, 533 F.2d 538 (Ct. C1. 1976). 
The reason for interpreting the words "implied contract" in the Tucker Act as provid- 
ing jurisdiction only for contracts implied in fact appears to be historical. One commenta- 
tor writing at the time of the passage of the Tucker Act observed: 
The terms "express contract" and "contracts implied in fact" are used then to 
indicate, not a distinction in the principles of contract, but a difference in the 
character of the evidence by which a simple contract is proved. The source of 
the obligation in each case is the intention of the parties. 
The phrase "contract implied in law" is used, however, to denote, not the 
nature of the evidence by which the claim of the plaintiff is to be established, 
but the source of the obligation itself. It is a term used to cover a class of 
obligations where the law, though the defendant did not intend to assume an 
obligation, imposes an obligation upon him, notwithstanding the absence of 
intention on his part, and in many cases in spite of his actual dissent. 
Kenner, Quasi Contract, Its Nature and Scope, 7 HARV. L. REV. 57, 59 (1893). Since 
implied in law contracts were not considered true contractual obligations, a statute, such 
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Contracts implied in fact are based on a manifestation of assent 
found in the conduct of the parties although not expressly stated. 
In contracts implied in law, or quasi-contracts, there is no mani- 
festation of assent-they are a fiction created by the court to 
prevent the unjust enrichment of one of the parties.zY 
The distinction between contracts implied in fact and con- 
tracts implied in law seems simple, but it has become blurred in 
a few contexts.30 For example, in cases where the government has 
illegally received money belonging to an innocent citizen, the 
Court of Claims has implied an obligation on the part of the 
government to return the money.31 This is essentially a restitu- 
tionary recovery granted without mention of mutual assent. In 
one case involving an alleged oral contract, a district court sitting 
under Tucker Act juri~diction~~ admitted the relief it fashioned 
might be quasi-contractual in nature.33 Despite these apparent 
excursions into the realm of contracts implied in law, lower courts 
have not fully disregarded the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
Tucker Act jurisdi~tion.~' The federal courts have been particu- 
larly reluctant to grant anything resembling quasi-contractual 
relief on illegal contracts because the rule prohibiting such recov- 
eries deters contractors from entering illegal bargainseS5 
The Court of Claims has, however, permitted recovery on a 
contract implied in fact when the express contract is found ille- 
gal. New York Mail & Newspaper Transportation Co. u. United 
States" has been cited by the Court of Claims as permitting an 
implied in fact recovery where the express contract was illegal?' 
The contract in New York Mail provided for the rental by the 
government of pneumatic tubes for the purpose of mail delivery. 
as the Tucker Act, intended to waive immunity for contract claims would not include 
implied in law contracts. 
29. E.g., J.C. Pittman & Sons v. United States, 317 F.2d 366, 368 (Ct. Ci. 1963). 
30. For a discussion of the various contexts in which the Court of Claims apparently 
permits quasi-contractual recovery, see Mewett, The Quasi-Contractual Liability of Gov- 
ernments, 13 U. TORONTO L.J. 56 (1959); Note, Government Contracts: Quasi-Contractual 
Recovery Against the Government, 42 CORNELL .Q. 278 (1957). 
31. E.g., Kirkendall v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 766 (Ct. C1. 1940). See also Royal 
Indem. Co. v'. Board of Educ., 137 F. Supp. 890 (M.D.N.C. 1956). 
32. The section of the Tucker Act giving district courts jurisdiction to hear contract 
claims against the United States is codified a t  28 U.S.C. f~ 1346 (1976). 
33. Halvorson v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D. Wash. 1954). 
34. E.g., Barnett v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 631 (D.S.C. 1975); Collins v. United 
States, 532 F.2d 1344 (Ct. C1. 1976). 
35. See generally Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575 (1921); Elgin Manor, hlc. v. 
United States, 279 F.2d 268 (Ct. C1. 1960). 
36. 154 F. Supp. 271 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957). 
37. 347 F.2d at  529. 
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After substantial expense had been incurred by the contractor, 
the government declared the contract illegal for failure to follow 
formal advertising procedures. The court held that because there 
was a bona fide purpose to render services to the United States 
the parties should be returned to the position they would have 
occupied without the attempted contract. It is, however, impor- 
tant to note that the opinion itself never uses the words "implied 
in fact contract." Only subsequent interpretation has given the 
case this significance. 
3. Contract by estoppel 
In private contract cases courts will occasionally estop the 
parties from denying the validity of a contract if entered into in 
good faith and performed by one party.38 The government can be 
estopped when its agents knowingly mislead the contractor with 
conduct or communications upon which the contractor could be 
expected to rely.3B Estoppel, however, does not apply to the for- 
mation of a contract that violates procurement law. In this situa- 
tion the contractor is deemed to have constructive knowledge of 
procurement law and the limitations that it places on an agent's 
authority; formation of a contract beyond that authority cannot 
be in good faith. This rationale was articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill. The plaintiff 
in that case, a farmer, received oral assurances that reseeded 
wheat was covered by federal insurance, when in reality Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation regulations prohibited coverage of 
reseeded wheat. When the farmer suffered the loss of his crop he 
brought suit to recover on the policy. The Supreme Court stated: 
Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone 
entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the 
risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act 
for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority. 
. . . And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may 
have been unaware of the limitations upon his a~thority.~'  
When the duty is placed on the contractor to know the limits of 
the government agent's authority in a formation situation, the 
See, e.g., Daniel v. Tearney, 102 U.S. 415 (1880); Hunt v. Turner, 9 Tex. 193 
United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970). 
332 U.S. 380 (1947). 
Id. at 384. 
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contractor cannot claim that he entered a contract in excess of 
the agent's authority in good faith. 
C. Recourse to the Comptroller General 
Where the facts are undisputed and the government does not 
object, the Comptroller General has used his settlement power to 
allow recoveries on illegal contracts.42 For example, in one deci- 
sion the Secretary of War requested an advance ruling on whether 
a contractor could be reimbursed for his expenses on a contract 
tha t  violated the prohibitions against cost-plus-percentage-of- 
cost contracts. The Comptroller General recommended that the 
contractor be allowed to recover on a quantum meruit basis.43 
Regarding the Comptroller General's decisions granting relief on 
illegal contracts, one commentator stated: "Whatever the theory, 
it appears that the Comptroller General, in the instance of the 
illegal contract, grants relief that is not only technically beyond 
the power of the courts to give under the Tucker Act, but may 
be unavailable as a matter of private law."44 
The use of the words "quantum meruit" by the Comptroller 
General can be confusing. Often quantum meruit is used as a 
measure of damages for implied in fact contracts, meaning simply 
the reasonable value of the benefit conferred.45 In other deci- 
sions, however, the Comptroller General uses quantum meruit as 
a synonym for restitutionary recovery. For example, in one deci- 
sion he held, "If there has been no prior contract, formal, ex- 
pressed, or implied, the Government is liable on a quantum mer- 
uit for the service which has been rendered."46 This ambiguous 
usage4' does not raise jurisdictional questions because the Comp- 
- - 
42. The Comptroller General's response to illegal contracts has not been uniform. 
Some cases seem to apply the rigid standard of no recovery upon an illegal contract. In 
one decision involving a contract in violation of the Walsh-Healey Act, the Comptroller 
held: "Not only is an unauthorized contract unenforceable according to its terms, but no 
contract may be implied where a statute possibly prohibits the transaction." 33 Comp. 
Gen. 63, 65 (1953). 
43. 21 Comp. Gen. 800 (1942). 
44. Dickson, Restitutionary Concepts and Terminology in Government Contracts 
Decisions of the Comptroller General, 6 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 30 (1973). 
45. Harrington, Howard & Ash, 6 Comp. Gen. 84 (1926); Totty Trunk & Bag Co., 3 
Comp. Gen. 100 (1923). 
46. 1 Comp. Gen. 323, 325 (1921). 
47. In some cases quantum meruit recovery is denied because the mutual assent 
necessary for an implied in fact contract is absent. E.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc., 119761 2 
COMP. GEN. PROCUREMENT DEC. (FPI) 769. Other Comptroller General decisions permit a 
quantum meruit recovery in the absence of an implied in fact contract where a tangible 
benefit is received by the government and the unauthorized action is expressly or im- 
pliedly ratified. See SWF Plywood Co., [I9771 2 COMP. GEN. PROCUREMENT DEC. (FPI) 1 
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troller General's jurisdiction, unlike the Court of Claims', does 
not derive from the Tucker Act and its requirement of an express 
or implied in fact contract. 
11. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS 
Yosernite presented the problem of whether compensation 
should be awarded for services performed pursuant to an illegal 
express contract. The court found that the contract violated the 
statute limiting profit on cost-plus contracts to ten percent and 
the regulations prohibiting reimbursement of federal income 
taxes as fixed costs.48 
The court rejected the argument of YPC that the government 
should be estopped from denying the validity of the contract after 
YPC had performed for four years. The court correctly pointed 
out that the United States is never estopped from denying the 
legality of a contract that by its terms violates procurement law 
and added, " 'One who purports to contract with the United 
States assumes the risk that the official with whom he deals is 
clothed with actual authority to enter the contract alleged.' "4y 
Despite the conclusions that the express contract was not 
enforceable and that four years of performance did not make it 
enforceable, the court held that YPC was entitled to a quantum 
meruit recovery. The case was remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of damages representing the reasonable value of 
the benefit received by the government. The trial judge was in- 
structed that YPC's recovery should not exceed the total cost of 
YPC's performance plus ten percent.50 
The Court of Claims failed in Yosemite to confront the limi- 
tations of its jurisdiction and to explain the basis of recovery. 
Examination of prior decisions reveals three rationales that the 
Court of Claims has used to extend its jurisdiction to contracts 
that are defective under federal procurement law. However, when 
carefully examined none of these rationales completely explains 
the result in this case. 
297; Monitor Prods. Co., [I9761 2 COMP. GEN. PROCUREMENT D C. (FPI) fi 85; Dictametric 
Corp., [I9741 1 COMP. GEN. PROCUREMENT DEC. (FPI) fi 260. 
48. 582 F.2d at 560-61. 
49. Id. at 558 (quoting Haight v. United States, 204 Ct. C1.698, cert. denied, 429 U.S .  
841 (1976)). 
50. Id. at 561. 
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A. Did the Court of Claims Base the Recovery on an Implied in 
Fact Contract? 
The Court of Clailas has jurisdiction to render judgments on 
contracts implied in fact. There are indications in the opinion of 
the court that the mutual assent necessary for an implied in fact 
contract was present. For example, the court stated: "[Wlhile 
it is clear that the Government could no longer be bound by 
[the] terms of the Agreement, it is equally clear that the Govern- 
ment bargained for, agreed to pay for, and received the benefit 
of YPC's services. . . ."51 The court here lays considerable em- 
phasis on the fact that the government bargained for and agreed 
to pay for the transportation services. This implies a finding of 
mutual assent. The court reasoned further: 
In determining the amount which plaintiff is entitled to recover, 
the Trial Judge is instructed that we do not deem the Govern- 
ment to have assented to payment of more than 10 percent of 
the total costs of YPC's performance of the contract nor to reim- 
bursement of the federal income taxes.52 
One could infer from the court's language that, even though the 
Government could not assent to all the terms of the contract, the 
parties had substantially agreed to perform the contract and this 
substantial agreement could supply the basis for an implied in 
fact contract. 
While the parties could have entered an enforceable contract 
using the terms suggested by the court, the facts indicate the 
parties only assented to a contract that included all the terms. 
There was evidence that YPC would not have even entered the 
contract if the illegal terms had been excluded." Given this evi- 
dence, it can hardly be said that the parties tacitly assented to 
the terms recommended by the court. 
YPC relied on New York Mail & Newspaper Transportation 
Co. v. United States,54 the case the Court of Claims cites as per- 
mitting implied in fact recovery when the express contract is 
illegal.55 New York Mail, however, involved a sort of illegal con- 
tract that made it a better case than Yosemite for finding an 
51. Id. at 560. 
52. Id. at 561 (emphasis in original). 
53. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 63, Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552 
(Ct. Cl. 1978). 
54. 154 F. Supp. 271 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.  904 (1957). 
55. See note 36 and accompanying text supra. 
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implied in fact contract. The contract in New York Mail was held 
invalid for the failure of the parties to conform to procurement 
regulations regarding formal advertising. The parties contracted 
for a legal purpose; only formation formalities invalidated the 
contract. The mutual assent necessary to find an implied in fact 
contract was evidenced by a document with legal terms that 
could be enforced in their entirety. The contract in Yosemite 
evidenced YPC's intent to render services for a compensation that 
was illegal; the terms of the contract were illegal, not just the 
formation. There is no evidence that the parties intended to en- 
force less than all of the terms of the contract. 
The court in Yosemite does not state that an implied in fact 
contract is the basis of their judgment. However, if the sugges- 
tions of mutual assent lead to that conclusion, the decision is the 
first to hold that contractors can include terms that violate pro- 
curement laws and still recover on implied in fact theory. 
B. Did the Court Apply the Christian Rationale? 
In the past the Court of Claims has been willing to insert into 
government contracts the terms necessary to make them conform 
to federal procurement law. When the Yosernite court instructed 
the trial judge regarding the measure of damages in this case, it 
merely substituted the maximum legal percentage for that agreed 
to by the parties and disallowed federal income taxes as a reim- 
bursable fixed cost. 
The leading case permitting insertion of the terms necessary 
to make a government contract legal is G. L. Christian & Asso- 
ciates v. United StatesY The contract in that case did not include 
the government's mandatory termination-for-convenience clause. 
Because regulations require the clause in all government con- 
tracts and because failure to include it would make the contract 
invalid, the court assumed that the parties bargained with the 
clause in mind.57 
The facts in Yosemite can be easily distinguished from those 
in Christian. In Christian the contract was silent on the issue of 
termination for convenience, hence the court was able to assume 
that the parties intended that the standard clause be implied. 
The contract in Yosemite was not silent on the issue of compensa- 
tion but expressly provided for compensation illegal under pro- 
56. 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl.), rehearing denied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 
U.S. 954 (1963). 
57. 312 F.2d at 424-27. 
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curement law. The Christian concept of reformation has not been 
extended to contracts where an express term would have to be 
changed to make the contract legal? The policy reason for not 
permitting a party to an illegal contract to simply exclude any 
illegal terms and enforce the remainder is that little incentive 
would be left for contractors to exclude illegal terms in their 
contracts if, when they do, they can still recover on the next best 
legal terms. 
C. Did the Court of Claims Recognize Quantum Meruit as an 
Exclusive Theory of Recovery? 
The court's specific use in Yosemite of quantum meruit with- 
out any treatment of whether the basis of recovery was contract 
implied in law or in fact creates the impression that quantum 
meruit is an alternative form of recovery. This impression is 
strengthened when Yosemite is read in light of Narva Harris Con- 
struction Corp. v. United States," a decision written by Judge 
Kunzig three months prior to his decision in Yosemite. In Narva 
Harris ah agent of the United States made oral representation 
during the negotiation of an urban renewal construction contract 
that the contractor's cost estimates could be adjusted upward at  
a later date. When this opportunity was never provided, the con- 
tractor brought an action for breach of contract. The government 
moved for summary judgment on grounds that the alleged agree- 
ment violated a statute requiring written contracts. In denying 
the government's motion, the Court of Claims recognized it could 
not give implied in law recovery, but stated several times that the 
contractor might be entitled to a recovery "on implied-in-fact 
contract or quantum meruit."" The use of the disjunctive sug- 
gests implied in fact contract and quantum meruit may be alter- 
native theories of recovery. 
The idea of quantum meruit as a form of recovery indepen- 
58. The following language from Yosemite may imply that Judge Kunzig allowed the 
quantum meruit recovery on the express contract, after severing the illegal price terms: 
"The plaintiff is not entitled to enforcement of the provision of the express, written 
contract a t  issue here since those provisions are invalid as violative of the applicable 
procurement law. We also hold, however, that plaintiff is entitled to recover as quantum 
meruit the reasonable value of the services. . . ." 582 F.2d at 561. Compare this with the 
court's earlier statement that the contract "is rendered invalid as not in accordance with 
applicable procurement statutes and regulations." Id. at 553-54. 
59. 574 F.2d 508 (Ct. C1. 1978). Cf. Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. United States, 580 F.2d 
433 (Ct. C1. 1978) (decided the same day as Yosemite; used quantum meruit as measure 
of damages for a contract implied in fact). 
60. 574 F.2d at 510-11. 
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dent from implied contracts is not completely foreign to federal 
procurement law. The use of quantum meruit by Judge Kunzig 
in both Yosemite and Narva Harris is reminiscent of Comptroller 
General decisions 
I t  is not clear whether the use of quantum meruit by the 
Court of Claims in Narva Harris and Yosemite is fashioned after 
the usage of the Comptroller General or private contract law. In 
either instance, the Court of Claims has failed to confront the 
limits of its jurisdiction. The Comptroller General derives its au- 
thority to grant quantum meruit relief from the settlement pow- 
ers conferred upon the office by Congress. Neither the Comptrol- 
ler General nor courts adjudicating private contracts are bound 
by the implied in lawlimplied in fact distinction imposed upon 
the Court of Claims by the Tucker Act. 
D. Evaluation 
No clear precedent permits the Court of Claims under the 
facts of Yosemite to grant a recovery on any of the theories dis- 
cussed in this Note, nor is it clear that the court intended by its 
decision to expand any of these theories. The court may have 
sought what it considered a fair result but left its reasoning inten- 
tionally vague to rob the decision of precedential value. On the 
other hand, the decision may be an additional venture by the 
Court of Claims into the realm of quasi-contract. 
The Yosemite decision will most likely invite further attacks 
on the rules prohibiting recovery on illegal contracts and limiting 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to express or implied in 
fact contracts. Resolution of the issue is the responsibility of the 
Supreme Court, where the advantages of giving the Court of 
Claims authority to grant restitutionary relieP2 should be bal- 
anced against the largely historical reasons for the implied in 
lawlimplied in fact distinction and the need for deterring contrac- 
tors from entering illegal bargains. 
The government did not appeal the decision of the Court of 
Claims in Yosemite. The government may sense that its position 
is vulnerable and that the only way of preserving the rule prohib- 
iting recovery on implied in law contracts is to raise it only in the 
best cases. 
- - -- - - - - - 
61. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra. 
62. These advantages are considered in Wall & Chilfres, The Law of Restitution and 
the Federal Government, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 587 (1971). 
432 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Yosemite the Court of Claims did not explain how it 
granted relief on an illegal contract within the limitations of the 
Tucker Act. The court's prior decisions do not explain the result. 
Past decisions involving illegal procurement contracts in which 
recovery was based on mutual assent or reformation can be dis- 
tinguished from Yosemite. The terms of the contract in Yosemite 
clearly and directly violated procurement statutes and regula- 
tions-there is no precedent for extending New York Mail or 
Christian that far. Such an extension, if possible, might be unde- 
sirable given the government's interest in discouraging the forma- 
tion of illegal contracts. Only further litigation can establish 
whether, by its decision in Yosemite, the Court of Claims in- 
tended to open the door to litigants seeking quasi-contractual 
relief on illegal contracts. Since the Supreme Court essentially 
created the rule limiting the Court of Claims' jurisdiction, it must 
ultimately decide the issue. 
Anthony B. Quinn 
